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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a secret way to share keys between legitimate users
which is guaranteed by the law of quantum mechanics. Most recently, the limitation of transmission
distance without quantum repeaters was broken through by twin-field QKD [Nature (London) 557,
400 (2018)]. Based on its main idea, sending or not-sending (SNS) QKD protocol was proposed
[Phys. Rev. A 98, 062323 (2018)], which filled the remaining security loopholes and can tolerate
large misalignment errors. In this paper, we give a more general model for SNS QKD, where the
two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, can possess asymmetric quantum channels. By applying the
method present in the work, the legitimate users can achieve dramatically increased key generation
rate and transmission distance compared with utilizing the original symmetric protocol. Therefore,
our present work represents a further step along the progress of practical QKD.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), based on the law of quantum mechanics[1–3], allows
two distant users (Alice and Bob) to establish a string of secure keys despite at the existence
of the malicious eavesdropper (Eve). Since the first QKD protocol BB84 [4] came into being,
numerous protocols [5–9] were proposed to promote its development. The goal of QKD is
to own high security and long transmission distance simultaneously. To illuminate the
relationship between transmittance (η) and key rate (R), R = − log(1 − η) is summarized
[10] without quantum repeaters, which are regarded as a solution to overcome the limit of
R ∝ O(η). However, due to the restriction of current technology, quantum repeater is far
from use [11, 12]. Luckily, twin-field (TF) QKD, based on the single-photon interference,
with R ∝ O(√η) is presented [13].
TF-QKD inherits the idea of measurement-device independent (MDI) and drastically
improves the transmission distance at the same time. Upon its proposal, TF-QKD has
been extensively studied [14–21]. Among these works, Wang et al. developed a sending or
not-sending (SNS) TF-QKD protocol[15]. Without phase announcement for Z basis (sig-
nal state), SNS TF-QKD fills the remaining loophole of original TF-QKD. Moreover, due
to single-photon interferences only in X basis (decoy states), SNS TF-QKD can tolerate
the largest misalignment errors. This protocol seems much more practical for implementa-
tions than the original TF-QKD, and its performance has been investigated by considering
statistical fluctuation and finite numbers of phase slices [19].
In real life, most locations of users are not on the symmetry of untrusted third party
(UTP). Especially in a multi-user network, UTP can hardly locate at the centre of all users.
One simple solution is to add extra fibers or attenuations at the closer side to compensate the
difference between the two transmittances, where original symmetric protocol is certainly
suitable. This seems to be a ”buckets effect”, and the final key rate is limited by the
smaller transmittance.
In this work, we develop a general model for the SNS TF-QKD, where the two parties
possess asymmetric quantum channels. Different from previous works on asymmetric MDI-
QKD [22–24], decoy-state method can not applied directly in asymmetric SNS TF-QKD.
According to our analysis, decoy-state method still can be an efficient and secure method in
present work only by satisfying some extra constraints.
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The paper is organized as follow: In Sec II, we will introduce some basic steps on how
to implement asymmetric SNS TF-QKD. Besides, decoy-state method and other theoreti-
cal models are given. Corresponding numerical simulations are shown in Sec III. Finally,
summaries and outlooks are given out in Sec IV.
II. THE DECOY-STATE ASYMMETRIC SNS TF-QKD
In this section, without adding extra compensation of transmittance, we will show the
possibility of applying decoy state asymmetric SNS TF-QKD only by adjusting dependent
intensities and other parameters.
A. Basic steps of decoy-state asymmetric SNS TF-QKD
Below let us describe the detailed SNS TF-QKD in asymmetric situation. Corresponding
schematic setup is shown in Fig.1.
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FIG. 1. Schematic setup of asymmetric SNS TF-QKD. WCS: weak coherent source; PM: phase
modulator; IM: intensity modulator; D1(D2): single-photon detector. Bob is farther from UTP
than Alice; La and Lb are the distance between user and the UTP respectively.
(0) For each time window, i, Alice and Bob send a strong reference light with coherent
state pulses to the UTP. Besides, they add extra random phases δa and δb to their pulses.
Here, we denote the distance between user and the UTP as La and Lb (La < Lb ) respectively.
(1) Alice (Bob) randomly chooses signal window (Z-window) and decoy window (X-
window) with probability Pza (Pzb) and 1− Pza (1− Pzb). In Z-window, Alice (Bob) de-
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termines to send a signal state pulse
∣∣√uaeiδa+iγa〉 (∣∣√ubeiδb+iγb〉) with probability εa (εb),
and not to send with 1 − εa (1 − εb); In X-window, Alice and Bob emit decoy state pulse∣∣√αeiδa+iγa〉and ∣∣√βeiδb+iγb〉, respectively. α ∈ {va, wa, o}; β ∈ {vb, wb, o}. γa and γb are
the global phase. Note that, in asymmetric situation, Alice is reasonably assumed to be
closer to the UTP than Bob. Then, she should postpone the emission for τ time-windows to
ensure the synchronization, i.e, the two states chosen at the same time-windows reach the
beam splitter simultaneously.
(2) After the UTP performs the phase compensation with the aid of strong reference light,
the two-mode state turns into, for example,
∣∣√αeiδa〉 ∣∣√βeiδb〉. Then the UTP measures the
incoming pulses and records the clicking or non-clicking events of the two detectors.
(3)The UTP announces the measurement outcomes after the distribution progress ends.
Then, the users announce for each pulse whether it is a Z-window or an X-window. The
intensity and extra phase of X-window should also be public. An efficient event is defined
as the following two cases: (a) Alice and Bob both choose Z-windows and only one detector
clicking at UTP’s side. In this case, four events and the corresponding raw keys are shown
in Table I; (b) Alice and Bob both choose the corresponding intensities in X-window when
UTP announces single clicking of detectors, and the phases δa , δb should satisfy either of
following two inequations:
|δa − δb| ≤ 2pi
M
, |δa − δb − pi| ≤ 2pi
M
. (1)
M is the number of phase slices pre-determine by users.
TABLE I. When an effective event happened in Z-window, if Alice (Bob) decides to send a signal
pulse, she (he) records a bit 1 (0); if Alice (Bob) decides not to send a signal pulse, she (he) records
a bit 0 (1);
Alice
keys Bob
Sending Not-sending
Sending 10 11
Not-sending 00 01
(4)After the announcement, Alice and Bob get the gain in Z-window. By sacrificing some
bits in Z-window, Alice and Bob get the average quantum bit error rate (QBER) in Z basis.
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Besides, they estimate the single-photon yield Y1 and the error rate e1 by observed values
in X-window.
(5)Error correction and privacy amplification are performed before calculating the final
secret keys.
B. Decoy-state method and theoretical models
Before introducing the decoy-state formulae of this protocol, we will review its essence.
In a decoy-state method [5–7], legitimate users need to modulate light pulses into different
intensities and post-announce the details. Eve can not distinguish which one is the signal
state pulse, and can only carry out identical attacking strategies in quantum channels. As a
result, the photon-number-splitting attacks will affect the yields, Yn, and QBER, en which
only depend on the numbers of photons n. Whether an eavesdropper exists can be judged
from the reasonability of Yn and en. In essence, decoy state method is based on the following
equations:
Yn(signal) = Yn(decoy),
en(signal) = en(decoy). (2)
Now let us come to the asymmetric SNS TF-QKD: Denote Alice and Bob send pulses
with intensities xa, xb respectively, and corresponding transmittances are ηa, ηb (ηa > ηb).
For simplicity, we assume that the two detectors at UTP’s sides are identical and each with
a dark count rate Pd and detection efficiency ηd individually.
The counting rate of the n-photon states which causes effective events can be written as:
Qxaxbn =
n∑
m=0
e−xaxa
m
m!
e−xbxb
n−m
(n−m)! [1− (1− Pd)
2(1− ηa)m(1− ηb)n−m]. (3)
Hereafter, we call the above event as the n-photon effective event. Considering it may
possess m photons from Alice and (n−m) photons form Bob, the equivalent photon number
distribution can be formulated as:
Pn(xa + xb) =
n∑
m=0
e−xaxa
m
m!
e−xbxb
n−m
(n−m)! . (4)
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Correspondingly, the equivalent yield of the n-photon effective event can be expressed as:
Y xaxbn =
Qxaxbn
Pn(xa + xb)
=1− (1− Pd)2[xa(1− ηa) + xb(1− ηb)
xa + xb
]n
=1− (1− Pd)2[k(1− ηa) + (1− ηb)
k + 1
]n, (5)
where k = xa
xb
. Obviously, in the asymmetric case, the value of Y xaxbn is not only dependent
on the photon numbers (n), but also related to the ratio (k) of two intensities. Therefore,
the original lower bound of the single-photon counting rate (Y1) and upper bound of the
single-photon error rate (e1) cannot be applied directly. In the Appendix, we will give
corresponding proof for the renewed formulae.
In Eq.(5), Y xaxbn is concerned with the ratio k. For convenience, we denote Y
xaxb
n (Q
xaxb
n )as
Y kn (Q
k
n); Denote wa + wb = µ1, va + vb = µ2,
wa
wb
= k1,
va
vb
= k2. According to the analysis in
the Appendix, for k1 ≤ k2, we can get the lower bound of single-photon yield in X-window
Y L1 =
P2(µ2)Qµ1 − P2(µ1)Qµ2 + [P2(µ1)P0(µ2)− P2(µ2)P0(µ1)]Y0
P2(µ2)P1(µ1)− P2(µ1)P1(µ2) . (6)
In addition, to estimate the single-photon yield in Z-window, a restriction on the ratio of
intensities, e.g., u1
u2
≥ k1, should be imposed. In this case, the yield in X-window is not larger
than the yield in Z-window. Thus, Y L1 can also be looked as the lower bound in Z-window.
Accordingly, the QBER of single-photon pulses is given by [15]:
e1 ≤ eU1 =
Qµ1Eµ1 − P0(µ1)Y0e0
P1(µ1)Y L1
, (7)
where e0 = 0.5.
In real-life implementations, the average counting rate and QBER in X-window can be
directly measured. In this work, we use a linear model to predict what it should be observed
in experiment. Consider a two-mode state
∣∣√αeiδa〉 ∣∣√βeiδb〉 goes through the quantum
channels and a beam-splitter. It turns into
∣∣∣∣√αηa2 eiδa +
√
βηb
2
eiδb
〉
⊗
∣∣∣∣√αηa2 eiδa −
√
βηb
2
eiδb
〉
.
The corresponding gains (Qδaδbαβ ) and the quantum-bit errors (Q
δaδb
αβ E
δaδb
αβ ) are given by
Qδaδbαβ = (1−Pd)e−
αηa
2
−βηb
2 (e− cos(δa−δb)
√
αβηaηb + ecos(δa−δb)
√
αβηaηb)− 2(1− Pd)2e−αηa−βηb , (8)
Qδaδbαβ E
δaδb
αβ = (1− Pd)e−
αηa
2
−βηb
2
−cos(δa−δb)
√
αβηaηb − (1− Pd)2e−αηa−βηb . (9)
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After phase post-selection in X-window, |δa − δb| are ranging among [0, 2piM ] ∪ [pi, pi + 2piM ].
Define the system error rate as Esys =
1
2
−
√
x1η1x2η2
x1η1+x2η2
+
2
√
x1η1x2η2
x1η1+x2η2
Ed, where Ed is the build-in
misalignment error of the optical system. Here Esys comes from single-photon interference
and leads to an extra equivalent phase differences between Alice and Bob, denoted as ∆ =
arccos(1−2Esys). By integrating, the average gain and quantum-bit errors can be expressed
as
Qαβ =
M2
4pi2
∫ 2pi
M
+∆
∆
∫ 2pi
M
0
Qδaδbαβ dδadδb, (10)
QαβEαβ =
M2
4pi2
∫ 2pi
M
+∆
∆
∫ 2pi
M
0
Qδaδbαβ E
δaδb
αβ dδadδb. (11)
Finally, with the above formulae, the key generation rate can be expressed as
R = PzaPzb{[εa(1− εb)e−uaua + εb(1− εa)e−ubub]Y L1 [1−H(eU1 )]−QuaubfH(Euaub)}, (12)
where Quaub and Euaub are the average gain and QBER of effective events in Z-window;f is
the error correction efficiency; H(ξ) = −ξlog2(ξ)− (1− ξ)log2(1− ξ).
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
With all the above formulae, we can now carry out numerical simulations for the asym-
metric SNS TF-QKD. To be noted, for the asymmetric case, in order to reach the highest
visibility of single-photon interference in the UTP’s side, certain constraints should be set
on the system parameters, to make light from each path possessing the same intensity before
the beam-splitter. Statistical fluctuation is also taken into account. For simplicity, we make
a Gaussian distribution assumption of the channel fluctuations and apply the standard de-
viation method, setting the failure probability as 10−7 [25]. Finite number of phase slices,
M , is considered. The experimental parameters used here are taken from Ref.[19], which
are listed out in Table II. Besides, global optimization is applied for a better performance.
In Fig. 2, La(Lb) is the distance between Alice (Bob) and the UTP. As mentioned above,
by adding extra attenuations, QKD system with asymmetric channels can be transformed
into a symmetric one. Hereafter, we call it the original symmetric method. For a vivid
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FIG. 2. Result of secret key rate with respect to the total transmission distance (La+Lb). The line
marked with ’0’ represents the original symmetric case; ’La = 0’ represents the special case that
Alice and UPT are together. Among the rest lines, Label ’Asy’ means the asymmetric method in
this work; ’Sym’ is for directly using the symmetric method by adding extra attenuations; The
numbers in the label are the value of Lb − La.
comparison, we plot the secret key rate by using two different methods: the original sym-
metric method and the asymmetric method proposed in this work. Obviously, the present
asymmetric work significantly improves both the secret key rate and the transmission dis-
tance compared with the original symmetric one. Consider an extreme case, where UTP
and Alice are in the same lab (La = 0). It seems like a BB84 protocol with two parties and
the transmission distance is about half of the symmetric case. By analogy, we can regard
the key rate of asymmetric SNS TF-QKD and transmittance as a relationship of R ∝ O(ησ),
TABLE II. Parameters for simulations. ηd and Pd are detection efficiency and dark counting rate
per pulse of UTP’s detectors respectively; Ed is misalignment error of optical system; α is the
transmission fiber loss constant; f is the error correction efficiency; N is the number of total
pluses.
ηd Pd Ed α(dB/km) f N
50% 1× 10−10 15% 0.2 1.1 1012
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FIG. 3. Secret key rate as a function of the Ed when La=50km, Lb=150km.
σ ∈ (1
2
, 1).
Moreover, as we can see from Fig.3, in an asymmetric case, the SNS TF-QKD can tolerate
very high misalignment errors, e.g., it can still generate secret keys even when Ed exceeds
0.35. In original TF-QKD, the single-photon interference is a challenging technology and
may cause large misalignment errors. While in the SNS TF-QKD, it only needs sending
or-not sending pulses instead of interference in Z-window, and can thus tolerate much larger
misalignment errors. In the present asymmetric case, the advantages hold on and make it
very promising candidate in practical applications.
IV. SUMMARIES AND OUTLOOKS
In conclusion, we have extended the SNS TF-QKD to the asymmetric case and given
a general model. The lower bound of the yield and the upper bound of the QBER for
single-photon contributions have been rederived. Then the asymmetry of channels could be
compensated by optimizing the adjustable system parameters. Through implementing full
parameter optimization on the numerical simulations, we demonstrate that our new method
can dramatically improve the key generation rate and the transmission distance compared
with the original symmetric method. In addition, some state-of-the-art optimization tech-
niques, such as collective constraints and joint estimations can be applied to further improve
the performance [19, 26]. Therefore, our work represent a further step towards practical ap-
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plication of the QKD.
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APPENDIX
Below, we will give a detailed derivation of Eq. (6). First, to get the monotonicity of Y kn ,
we make a formula deformation:
Y kn=1− (1− Pd)2[
k(1− ηa) + (1− ηb)
k + 1
]n
= 1− (1− Pd)2[(1− ηa) + ηa − ηb
k + 1
]n. (13)
Obviously, when ηa > ηb, Y
k
n is an increasing function of k.
The average gains of the two decoy-states is given by:
Qµ1 = Y0P0(µ1) + Y
k1
1 P1(µ1) + Y
k1
2 P2(µ1) +
∞∑
n=3
Y k1n Pn(µ1), (14)
Qµ2 = Y0P0(µ2) + Y
k2
1 P1(µ2) + Y
k2
2 P2(µ2) +
∞∑
n=3
Y k2n Pn(µ2). (15)
When k1 ≤ k2, Y k1n ≤ Y k2n holds on. Eq.(15) can be expressed as:
Qµ2 = Y0P0(µ2) + Y
k1
1 P1(µ2) + Y
k1
2 P2(µ2) +
∞∑
n=3
Y k1n Pn(µ2) + ∆1, (16)
where ∆1 = (Y
k2
1 − Y k11 )P1(µ2) + (Y k22 − Y k12 )P2(µ2) +
∞∑
n=3
(Y k2n − Y k1n )Pn(µ2) ≥ 0.
By using the similar method as in Ref. [25]:
P2(µ2)Qµ1 = P2(µ2)Y0P0(µ1) + P2(µ2)Y
k1
1 P1(µ1) + P2(µ2)Y
k1
2 P2(µ1) +P2(µ2)
∞∑
n=3
Y k1n Pn(µ1),
(17)
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P2(µ1)Qµ2 = P2(µ1)Y0P0(µ2)+P2(µ1)Y
k1
1 P1(µ2)+P2(µ1)Y
k1
2 P2(µ2)+P2(µ1)
∞∑
n=3
Y k1n Pn(µ2)+P2(µ1)∆1.
(18)
Combining Eq.(17) and Eq.(18), we can get:
P2(µ1)Qµ2 − P2(µ2)Qµ1
=[P2(µ1)P0(µ2)− P2(µ2)P0(µ1)]Y0 + [P2(µ1)P1(µ2)− P2(µ2)P1(µ1)]Y k11
+ P2(µ1)
∞∑
n=3
Y k1n Pn(µ2)− P2(µ2)
∞∑
n=3
Y k1n Pn(µ1) + P2(µ1)∆1. (19)
Denote P2(µ1)
∞∑
n=3
Y k1n Pn(µ2) − P2(µ2)
∞∑
n=3
Y k1n Pn(µ1) = ∆2. Due to the weak coherent
source satisfying the following condition [25]:
Pn(µ2)
Pn(µ1)
≥ P2(µ2)
P2(µ1)
≥ P1(µ2)
P1(µ1)
, (20)
we can conclude that ∆2 > 0.
Finally, when k1 ≤ k2, the lower bound of the single-photon yield:
Y k11 ≥ Y L1 =
P2(µ2)Qµ1 − P2(µ1)Qµ2 + [P2(µ1)P0(µ2)− P2(µ2)P0(µ1)]Y0
P2(µ2)P1(µ1)− P2(µ1)P1(µ2) . (21)
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